Date: 14h30, May 16, 2023. Lagrange Gris Seminar Room
Speaker: Konstantinos Varsos (CWI, The Netherlands)
Abstract: We consider multi-agent interactions where the agents are misinformed with regards to the game that they play, essentially having an incorrect understanding of the game setting, without being aware of their misinformation. In this talk, we present games where misinformation is due to structured (white) noise that affects additively the payoff values of agents. We provide the general properties of these games and derive theoretical formulas related to “behavioral consistency”, i.e., the probability that the agent’s behavior will not be significantly affected by the noise. We highlight several of the properties of these formulas and present an experimental evaluation that validates and visualizes these results. Further, we show the inefficiency of the system caused by misinformation using the metric of the Price of Misinformation.
