SEMINARS

Events in May–June 2017

Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday

May

May 1, 2017
May 2, 2017
May 3, 2017
May 4, 2017(1 event)

Keynote LIG


May 4, 2017

Bâtiment IMAG (amphitheater)
Saint-Martin-d'Hères, 38400
France
May 5, 2017
May 6, 2017
May 7, 2017
May 8, 2017
May 9, 2017
May 10, 2017
May 11, 2017(1 event)

Almost acyclic simple stochastic games by Pierre Coucheney (Univ. Versailles)


May 11, 2017

A simple stochastic game is a 2 players zero-sum game played on a
graph. The game consists in moving a pebble on the graph. Players
control the direction taken by the pebble on disjoint sets of
vertices, and the direction of the other vertices is randomly
determined. The goal of the player called MAX (resp. MIN) is to
make the pebble reach a sink with the highest (resp. lowest)
possible value.

Computing the optimal strategies of this game is one of the few
problems in NP and coNP which is not known to be in P. This
problem is also interesting for worst case stochastic
optimization, since Markov decision process with an adversary can
be reduced to it. However, there are instances for which the game
can be solved in polynomial time. This is the case if the graph
is acyclic. In this talk, I will show that several classes of
graph closed to acyclic graphs are tractable. I will also present
algorithmic questions related to similar reachability problem on
rotor graph, which is also known to be in NP and coNP but not in P.

Bâtiment IMAG (442)
Saint-Martin-d'Hères, 38400
France
May 12, 2017
May 13, 2017
May 14, 2017
May 15, 2017
May 16, 2017
May 17, 2017
May 18, 2017(1 event)

Versions parallèles et distribuées de l'algorithme de meilleure réponse.


May 18, 2017

Dans cet exposé, nous calculons la complexité moyenne de l'algorithme de meilleure réponse dans des jeux de potentiel. Contrairement au cas le pire (complexité exponentielle), la complexité moyenne est linéaire en le nombre de joueurs. On montre aussi que l'algorithme de meilleure réponse est optimal parmi tous ceux qui reposent sur une information locale. Nous étudions aussi les versions distribuées de la dynamique de meilleure réponse. Nous montrons d’abord que la sélection du prochain joueur selon une suite IID donne un temps de convergence moyen à une constante multiplicative de celui d’une suite optimale. De plus, une telle suite IID peut être implémentée de manière distribuée nous permettant de proposer un algorithme distribué avec un coût en temps d’exécution global minimal. Ensuite nous montrons comment utiliser la structure des interactions entre joueurs pour, en permettant aux joueurs non associés d’agir simultanément, améliorer le temps d’exécution. Dans un contexte centralisé, les joueurs peuvent être groupés selon une coloration du graphe d’interaction permettant à la complexité d’être proportionnelle au nombre chromatique de ce graphe au lieu du nombre de joueurs. Enfin, cette structure peut aussi être exploitée dans le contexte distribué pour des algorithmes plus efficaces.

Bâtiment IMAG (442)
Saint-Martin-d'Hères, 38400
France
May 19, 2017
May 20, 2017
May 21, 2017
May 22, 2017
May 23, 2017
May 24, 2017
May 25, 2017
May 26, 2017
May 27, 2017
May 28, 2017
May 29, 2017
May 30, 2017
May 31, 2017

June

June 1, 2017(1 event)

Keynote LIG (Antoine Cornuéjols)


June 1, 2017

Bâtiment IMAG (amphitheater)
Saint-Martin-d'Hères, 38400
France
June 2, 2017
June 3, 2017
June 4, 2017
June 5, 2017
June 6, 2017
June 7, 2017
June 8, 2017(1 event)

LIG Day in Autrans

N/A
June 8, 2017

Autrans,
June 9, 2017
June 10, 2017
June 11, 2017
June 12, 2017
June 13, 2017
June 14, 2017
June 15, 2017(1 event)

Coalition games on interaction graphs by Nicolas Bousquet (Gscop)


June 15, 2017

We consider cooperative games where the viability of a coalition is determined by whether or not its members have the ability to communicate amongst themselves. This necessary condition for viability was proposed by Myerson and is modeled via an interaction graph; a coalition S of vertices is then viable if and only if the induced graph S is connected.

The non-emptiness of the core of a coalition game can be tested by a well-known covering LP. Moreover, the integrality gap of its dual packing LP defines exactly the multiplicative least-core and the relative cost of stability of the coalition game. This gap is upper bounded by the packing-covering ratio which is known to be at most the treewidth of the interaction graph plus one.

We examine the packing-covering ratio and integrality gaps of graphical coalition games in more detail. First we introduce a new graph parameter, called the vinewidth (a parameter derived from the treewidth), which characterizes the worst packing-covering ratio. Then we will show that this new parameter correctly evaluates both primal and dual integrality gaps.

Joint work with Zhentao Li and Adrian Vetta.

Bâtiment IMAG (442)
Saint-Martin-d'Hères, 38400
France
June 16, 2017
June 17, 2017
June 18, 2017
June 19, 2017
June 20, 2017
June 21, 2017
June 22, 2017(1 event)

Malcom Egan Seminar : "Mechanism design in on-demand transport"


June 22, 2017

Abstract: Uber is one of several recent companies adopting a business model that lies in stark contrast with the standard approach used by taxi services. Underlying Uber's business model is a new architecture--based on a market mechanism--which governs how commuters, drivers, and the company interact with each other. In this talk, we develop a new general model for on-demand transport networks with self-interested passengers and drivers. With this model, we introduce market mechanisms to allocate and price journeys, as well as the market formation subproblem. By analysis and simulation, we characterize the performance of the mechanisms and discuss insights using data obtained from a real on-demand transport provider.

Malcolm Egan received the B.E. degree in electrical engineering from the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, in 2009 and the Ph.D. in electrical engineering from the University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia, in 2014. In the years 2014-2016, he was a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of Computer Science, Czech Technical University in Prague, Czech Republic and in the Laboratoire de Mathématiques, Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand, France. He is now a Postdoctoral Researcher in CITI Lab, INSA-Lyon, INRIA, Université de Lyon. His research interests include optimization theory, mechanism design, information theory and statistical signal processing, as well as their applications.

Bâtiment IMAG (442)
Saint-Martin-d'Hères, 38400
France
June 23, 2017
June 24, 2017
June 25, 2017
June 26, 2017
June 27, 2017
June 28, 2017
June 29, 2017(1 event)

A stochastic approach for optimizing green energy consumption in distributed clouds by Fanny Dufossé (Inria)


June 29, 2017

A stochastic approach for optimizing green energy consumption in distributed clouds

The energy drawn by Cloud data centers is reaching worrying levels, thus inciting providers to install on-site green energy producers, such as photovoltaic panels. Considering distributed Clouds, workload managers need to geographically allocate virtual machines according to the green production in order not to waste energy. In this paper, we propose SAGITTA: a Stochastic Approach for Green consumption In disTributed daTA centers. We show that compared to the optimal solution, SAGITTA consumes 4% more brown energy, and wastes only 3.14% of the available green energy, while a traditional round-robin solution consumes 14.4% more energy overall than optimum, and wastes 28.83% of the available green energy.

Bâtiment IMAG (442)
Saint-Martin-d'Hères, 38400
France
June 30, 2017

July

July 1, 2017
July 2, 2017
  • April 3, 2024 @ Bâtiment IMAG (442) -- [Seminar] Victor Boone

    Who: Victor Boone

    When: Wednesday, April 3, 14:00-15:00

    Where: 447

    What: Learning MDPs with Extended Bellman Operators

    More: Efficiently learning Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) is difficult. When facing an unknown environment, where is the adequate limit between repeating actions that have shown their efficiency in the past (exploitation of your knowledge) and testing alternatives that may actually be better than what you currently believe (exploration of the environment)? To bypass this dilemma, a well-known solution is the "optimism-in-face-of-uncertainty" principle: Think of the score of an action as being the largest that is statistically plausible.

    The exploration-exploitation dilemma then becomes the problem of tuning optimism. In this talk, I will explain how optimism in MDPs can be all rephrased using a single operator, embedding all the uncertainty in your environment within a single MDP. This is a story about "extended Bellman operators" and "extended MDPs", and about how one can achieve minimax optimal regret using this machinery.

  • April 11, 2024 @ Bâtiment IMAG (442) -- [Seminar] Charles Arnal

    Who: Charles Arnal

    When: Thursday, April 11, 14:00-15:00

    Where: 442

    What: Mode Estimation with Partial Feedback

    More: The combination of lightly supervised pre-training and online fine-tuning has played a key role in recent AI developments. These new learning pipelines call for new theoretical frameworks. In this paper, we formalize core aspects of weakly supervised and active learning with a simple problem: the estimation of the mode of a distribution using partial feedback. We show how entropy coding allows for optimal information acquisition from partial feedback, develop coarse sufficient statistics for mode identification, and adapt bandit algorithms to our new setting. Finally, we combine those contributions into a statistically and computationally efficient solution to our problem.

  • April 30, 2024 @ Bâtiment IMAG (442) -- Seminar Rémi Castera

    Correlation of Rankings in Matching Markets

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