SEMINARS

MonthWeekDay
March 2020
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
February 24, 2020 February 25, 2020 February 26, 2020 February 27, 2020

Category: SeminarsStrategic information transmission with receiver's type-dependent decision sets, by Stephan Sémirat (GAEL, Grenoble)

Strategic information transmission with receiver's type-dependent decision sets, by Stephan Sémirat (GAEL, Grenoble)
February 28, 2020 February 29, 2020 March 1, 2020
March 2, 2020 March 3, 2020 March 4, 2020 March 5, 2020

Category: Seminarskeynote LIG

keynote LIG
March 6, 2020 March 7, 2020 March 8, 2020
March 9, 2020 March 10, 2020 March 11, 2020 March 12, 2020

Category: SeminarsSeminar Anastasios Giovanidis

Seminar Anastasios Giovanidis
March 13, 2020

Category: SeminarsF. Falniowski: "Robust routes to chaos in congestion games: The effects of scale on learning dynamics"

F. Falniowski: "Robust routes to chaos in congestion games: The effects of scale on learning dynamics"
March 14, 2020 March 15, 2020
March 16, 2020 March 17, 2020 March 18, 2020 March 19, 2020

Category: SeminarsSeminar CERAI Alexandre Termier

Seminar CERAI Alexandre Termier
March 20, 2020 March 21, 2020 March 22, 2020
March 23, 2020 March 24, 2020 March 25, 2020 March 26, 2020

Category: SeminarsPhD defense of Stephan Plassart (polaris)

PhD defense of Stephan Plassart (polaris)
March 27, 2020 March 28, 2020 March 29, 2020
March 30, 2020 March 31, 2020 April 1, 2020 April 2, 2020

Category: Seminarskeynote LIG

keynote LIG
April 3, 2020 April 4, 2020 April 5, 2020
  • March 13, 2020 @ -- F. Falniowski: "Robust routes to chaos in congestion games: The effects of scale on learning dynamics"

    We study the effects of increasing the population size/scale of costs in congestion games and generalize recent results for the well known Multiplicative Weights Update dynamic to a large class of Follow-the-Regularized Leader dynamics (FoReL). We prove that even in simple linear congestion games with two parallel links as the population/scale increases, learning becomes unstable and (unless the game is fully symmetric) eventually Li-Yorke chaotic. Despite their chaotic instability, the dynamics provably converge in a time-average sense to an exact equilibrium for any choice of learning rate and any scale of costs.

  • March 19, 2020 @ -- Seminar CERAI Alexandre Termier
  • March 26, 2020 @ -- PhD defense of Stephan Plassart (polaris)

    TBA

  • April 2, 2020 @ -- keynote LIG
  • April 9, 2020 @ Bâtiment IMAG (406) -- Giogio Fabbri (UGA)

    TBA

  • April 16, 2020 @ Bâtiment IMAG (406) -- Auréiien Garivier

    TBA

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