

# Reliable Broadcast vs Silent Churn

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### Cryptocurrency





### No need for a Blockchain

- [GKMPS19] Rachid Guerraoui, Petr Kuznetsov, Matteo Monti, Matej Pavlovic, Dragos-Adrian Seredinschi: "The Consensus Number of a Cryptocurrency". PODC 2019: 307-316
- [AFRT20] Alex Auvolat, Davide Frey, Michel Raynal, François Taïani: "Money Transfer Made Simple: a Specification, a Generic Algorithm, and its Proof". Bull. EATCS 132 (2020)
- [CGKKMPPS20] Daniel Collins, Rachid Guerraoui, Jovan Komatovic, Petr Kuznetsov, Matteo Monti, Matej Pavlovic, Yvonne-Anne Pignolet, Dragos-Adrian Seredinschi, Andrei Tonkikh, Athanasios Xygkis: "Online Payments by Merely Broadcasting Messages". DSN 2020: 26-38
- [BDS20] Mathieu Baudet, George Danezis, and Alberto Sonnino. 2020. FastPay: High-Performance Byzantine Fault Tolerant Settlement. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 163–177.



## All You Need is Broadcast

- Byzantine Reliable Broadcast
  - Formally introduced
    - 1984 Toueg (PODC 84)
    - 1985 Bracha & Toueg (JACM 85)
    - 1987 Bracha (I&C 87)
  - Ensure that
    - Correct processes: deliver the same set of messages
    - This set includes all the messages they br-broadcast

# Byzantine Reliable Broadcast

- Validity: If a correct process delivers a message *m* from a correct process *p<sub>i</sub>* then *p<sub>i</sub>* broadcast *m*
- Integrity: No correct process delivers a message *m* more than once
- **No-Duplicity:** No two correct processes deliver distinct messages from p<sub>i</sub>
- Local Delivery: If a correct process p<sub>i</sub> broadcasts m then at least one correct process eventually delivers it
- Global Delivery: If a correct process delivers a message *m* from *p<sub>i</sub>* then all correct processes deliver *m* from *p<sub>i</sub>*



# Introducing Silent Churn

- Typical work on distributed algorithms
  - join/leave operation informing other processes
  - announced disconnections / connections
  - Not what happens in real systems
- Silent Churn
  - Nodes can join or leave silently
  - Reflects the behavior of peer-to-peer systems
  - Model Silent Churn using Message Adversary
  - No attendance lists
  - Process ignore the online/offline state of other processes



### Message Adversary

- A message adversary is a (constrained) daemon that, at the network level, eliminates messages sent by processes
- Introduced in the context of synchronous networks by Santoro
  - Santoro N. and Widmayer P., "Time is not a healer". (STACS'89), Springer LNCS 349, pp. 304-316 (1989)
  - Santoro N. and Widmayer P., "Agreement in synchronous networks with ubiquitous faults". Theoretical Computer Science, 384(2-3): 232-249 (2007)



# Message Adversary Definition

Broadcast an (implementation) message

```
broadcast(v) {
    for (i in 1 .. n) {
        send (v) to p;
    }
}
```

- For each such broadcast, the message adversary is allowed to suppress up to d copies of v
- Remarks
  - Byzantine processes do not necessarily use the broadcast macro
  - d=0 <-> no message adversary



# Modeling Silent Churn with a Message Adversary

- set D of d' <= d processes</li>
- adversary suppresses all the messages sent to the processes in D,
  - making them input disconnected
- size and content of *D* can vary over time as long as d' < d
- Message adversary only constrains process inputs
  - Model is perfect with event-based algorithms
  - Open question as to what happens with general broadcast algorithms

### SCB, Silent Churn Broadcast, i.e. BRB with Msg Adv/Silent Churn

- Validity: If a correct process delivers a message *m* from a correct process *p<sub>i</sub>* then *p<sub>i</sub>* broadcast *m*
- Integrity: No correct process delivers a message *m* more than once
- **No-Duplicity:** No two correct processes deliver distinct messages from p<sub>i</sub>
- Local Delivery: If a correct process p<sub>i</sub> broadcasts m then at least one correct process eventually delivers it
- Global Delivery: If a correct process delivers a message *m* from *p<sub>i</sub>* then at most *d* correct processes do not deliver *m* from *p<sub>i</sub>*



### Two Main Results

• SCB impossible if n<=3t + 2d

• SCB algorithm with signatures



# SCB Impossible if n<=3t+2d

- Extension of the well known result for BRB
  - Same as BRB when d=0
  - Same as unreliable fair channels when t=0
- Holds for event-driven protocols
  - only send implementation messages in response to
    - broadcast operation
    - receipt of implementation messages
- Does it hold with spontaneous messages?
  - we conjecture it does
  - maybe...



## Towards an SCB Algorithm

- Signature Free BRB (Bracha's Algorithm)
- Signature-Based BRB
- Signature-Based SCB (Timothe's Algorithm)
- Signature-Free SCB?



# Signature-Free BRB (Bracha)

operation  $br_broadcast(sn, m)$  is

(1) broadcast INIT(sn, m).

#### when a message INIT(sn, m) is received from $p_j$ do

- (2) discard the message if it is not the first message INIT(sn, -) from  $p_j$ ;
- (3) broadcast ECHO $(\langle j, sn \rangle, m)$ .

#### when a message $\operatorname{ECHO}(\langle j, sn \rangle, m)$ is received from any process do

- (4) **if** (ECHO( $\langle j, sn \rangle, m$ ) received from strictly more than  $\frac{n+t}{2}$  different processes)  $\wedge$  (READY( $\langle j, sn \rangle, m$ ) not yet broadcast)
- (5) **then** broadcast READY $(\langle j, sn \rangle, m)$
- (6) **end if**.

#### when a message $\operatorname{READY}(\langle j, sn \rangle, m)$ is received from any process do

- (7) **if** (READY( $\langle j, sn \rangle, m$ ) received from at least (t + 1) different processes)  $\wedge$  (READY( $\langle j, sn \rangle, m$ ) not yet broadcast)
- (8) **then** broadcast READY $(\langle j, sn \rangle, m)$
- (9) **end if**;
- (10) **if** (READY( $\langle j, sn \rangle, m$ ) received from at least (2t + 1) different processes)  $\land (\langle j, sn \rangle, m)$  not yet br\_delivered from  $p_j$ )
- (11) **then** br\_delivery of (sn, m) from  $p_j$
- (12) end if.



# Signature-Based BRB (Timothé)

1 atomic operation  $r_{-}broadcast(v)$  is

```
2 \sigma_v \leftarrow \operatorname{sign}(v);
```

**3** broadcast INIT $\langle v, \sigma_v \rangle$ ;

```
4 when INIT\langle v, \sigma_v \rangle is received do

5 | if good(v, \sigma_v) \land \negalreadyRcvd(INIT\langle v, \sigma_v \rangle) then

6 | \sigma_{\sigma_v} \leftarrow \operatorname{sign}(\langle v, \sigma_v \rangle);

7 | broadcast ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, \sigma_{\sigma_v} \rangle;
```

```
8 when ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, \sigma_{\sigma_v} \rangle;
```

```
9 is received do
```

```
10 | if good(ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, \sigma_{\sigma_v} \rangle) \land \neg alreadyRcvd(ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, \sigma_{\sigma_v} \rangle) then

11 | \sigma'_{\sigma_v} \leftarrow sign(\langle v, \sigma_v \rangle);

12 | broadcast ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, \sigma'_{\sigma_v} \rangle;

13 | if numRcvd(ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, -\rangle) \ge \frac{n+t}{2} then

14 | deliver(v);
```



### If we add Message Adversary

• Safety is retained

• Liveness is lost



# Signature-Based SCB (Timothé)

```
\sigma_v \leftarrow \operatorname{sign}(v);
  \mathbf{2}
         \sigma_{\sigma_v} \leftarrow \operatorname{sign}(\langle v, \sigma_v \rangle);
  3
         broadcast ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, \sigma_{\sigma_v} \rangle;
  \mathbf{4}
  5 when ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, \sigma_{\sigma_v} \rangle is received do
            if good(ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, \sigma_{\sigma_v} \rangle) \land \neg received(ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, \sigma_{\sigma_v} \rangle) then
  6
                  if \neg \text{alreadySent}(\text{ECHO}\langle v, \sigma_v, - \rangle) then
  7
                         \sigma'_{\sigma_v} \leftarrow \operatorname{sign}(\langle v, \sigma_v \rangle);
  8
                         broadcast ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, \sigma'_{\sigma_v} \rangle;
  9
                  if numRcvd(ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, - \rangle) > \frac{n+t}{2} then
10
                         quorum<sub>i</sub> \leftarrow received ECHO's;
 11
                         broadcast QUORUM\langle v, \sigma_v, \mathsf{quorum}_i \rangle;
 12
13 when QUORUM\langle v, \sigma_v, quorum_i \rangle is received do
            if good(QUORUM\langle v, \sigma_v, quorum_i \rangle) then
14
                   recordReceivedEchos(QUORUM\langle v, \sigma_v, quorum_i \rangle);
15
                  if numRcvd(ECHO\langle v, \sigma_v, - \rangle) > \frac{n+t}{2} \land \negdelivered then
16
                          broadcast QUORUM\langle v, \sigma_v, quorum_i \rangle;
 17
                         delivered \leftarrow TRUE;
 18
                         deliver(v);
 19
```

1 atomic operation  $scb_broadcast(v)$  is



### Signature-Based SCB

- Two main changes
  - Collapse ECHO and INIT
    - (OR send ECHO without INIT)
  - Additional Communication Round
    - QUORUM message
    - make sure everyone reaches quorum of ECHOs



## Collapse ECHO and INIT


1 atomic operation  $r_broadcast(v)$  is  $\sigma_v \leftarrow \operatorname{sign}(v);$ broadcast INIT $\langle v, \sigma_v \rangle$ ; 1 atomic operation  $scb_broadcast(v)$  is  $\sigma_v \leftarrow \operatorname{sign}(v);$  $\mathbf{2}$ 3  $\sigma_{\sigma_v} \leftarrow \operatorname{sign}(\langle v, \sigma_v \rangle);$ broadcast ECHO $\langle v, \sigma_v, \sigma_{\sigma_v} \rangle$ ; 4

tackle case when INIT is lost

 $\mathbf{2}$ 

3


# Add QUORUM Message






### Add QUORUM Message

s when ECHO $\langle v, \sigma_v, \sigma_{\sigma_v} \rangle$ ; 9 is received do



### Signature-Free SCB?







### More Powerful Message Adversaries

- We considered receipt omissions
- How about altered messages?



### To Summarize

- Reliable Broadcast is Important
   Consensus is overrated
- Novel model for silent churn
- Modeled by a message adversary
- Impossibility if n<3t+2d with
- Novel Signature-Based Protocol
- Working on Signature-Free Protocol
- Theory (of Distributed Algorithms) is Fun!

