Jul 02

Paris Metro Tracks and Trackers: Why is the RATP App leaking my private data?

The PRIVATICS Inria team – July 2nd, 2013 – https://team.inria.fr/privatics/

(this blog has been modified on July 5th, 2013 upon request of FaberNovel)

The RATP iOS App

The RATP is the French public company that is managing the Paris subway (metro). It provides a dedicated and very useful smartphone App. In particular, privacy policy of RATP’s iOS App (version 5.4.1) claims: “The services provided by the RATP application, like displaying geo-targeted ads, does not involve any collection, processing or storage of personal data” (translated from their privacy policy, in French). Below is the screenshot of RATP’s In-App privacy policy (in French). It also says that this App is, in fact, developed and maintained by FaberNovel.

RATP_PrivacyPolicy

Now, having read above the privacy policy of the App, would you believe the fact that MAC Address of your iPhone’s WiFi chip, your iPhone’s name, and the list of processes running on it (which potentially reveals a subset of Apps installed on the smartphone) among other things, are being sent over the network to a remote third-party by RATP App? Well, if you don’t believe it; here you go. Below are two instances of data we captured on our iPhone while being sent over the network by the RATP App. One good news, though: this data is sent through SSL, not in clear, which avoids eavesdropping.


UTF8StringOfDataSentThroughSSL = {"p":["kernel_task", "launchd", "UserEventAgent", "sbsettingsd", "wifid", "powerd", "lockdownd", "mediaserverd", "mDNSResponder", "locationd", "imagent", "iaptransportd", "fseventsd", "fairplayd.N94", "configd", "kbd", "CommCenter", "BTServer", "notifyd", "aggregated", "networkd", "itunesstored", "apsd", "MyWiCore", "distnoted", "tccd", "filecoordination", "installd", "absinthed", "timed", "geod", "networkd_privile", "lsd","xpcd", "accountsd", "notification_pro", "coresymbolicatio", "assetsd", "AppleIDAuthAgent", "dataaccessd", "SCHelper", "backboardd", "ptpd", "syslogd", "dbstorage", "SpringBoard", "Facebook", "iFile_", "Messenger", "MobilePhone", "MobileVOIP", "MobileSafari", "webbookmarksd", "eapolclient", "mobile_installat", "AppStore", "syncdefaultsd", "sociald", "sandboxd", "RATP", "pasteboardd"], "additional":{"device_language":"en", "country_code":"FR" ,"adgoji_sdk_version":"v2.0.2", "device_system_name":"iPhone OS", "device_jailbroken":true, "bundle_version":"5.4.1", "vendorid":"CECC8023-98A2-4005-A1FB-96E3C3DA1E79", "allows_voip":false, "device_model":"iPhone", "macaddress":"60facda10c20", "asid":"496EA6D1-5753-40B2-A5C9-5841738374A2", "bundle_identifier":"com.ratp.ratp", "system_os_version_name":"iPhone OS", "device_name":"Jagdish's iPhone", "bundle_executable":"RATP", "device_localized_model":"iPhone", "openudid":"9c7a916a1703745ded05debc8c3e97bedbc0bcdd"}, "e":{"782EAF8A-FF82-48EF-B619-211A5CF1F654": [{"n":"start", "t":1369926018, "nonce":"IEx9HAzG" }]}}


UTF8StringOfDataSentThroughSSL = {"s":["fb210831918949520", "fb108880882526064", "evernote", "fbauth2", "fbauth", "fb", "fblogin", "fspot-image", "fb308918024569", "fspot", "fsq+pjq45qactoijhuqf5l21d5tyur0zosvwmfadyw0pvd4b434e+authorize", "fsq+pjq45qactoijhuqf5l21d5tyur0zosvwmfadyw0pvd4b434e+reply", "fsq+pjq45qactoijhuqf5l21d5tyur0zosvwmfadyw0pvd4b434e+post", "foursquareplugins", "foursquare", "fb86734274142", "fb124024574287414", "instagram", "fsq+kylm3gjcbtswk4rambrt4uyzq1dqcoc0n2hyjgcvbcbe54rj+post", "fb-messenger", "fb237759909591655", "RunKeeperPro", "fb62572192129", "fb76446685859", "fb142349171124", "soundcloud", "fb19507961798", "x-soundcloud", "fb110144382383802", "mailto", "spotify", "fb134519659678", "fb174829003346", "fb109306535771", "tjc459035295", "twitter", "com.twitter.twitter-iphone", "com.twitter.twitter-iphone+1.0.0", "tweetie", "com.atebits.Tweetie2", "com.atebits.Tweetie2+2.0.0", "com.atebits.Tweetie2+2.1.0", "com.atebits.Tweetie2+2.1.1", "com.atebits.Tweetie2+3.0.0", "FTP", "PPClient", "fb184136951108"]}

Fortunately, it’s not trivial to detect all the Apps installed on the iPhone because 1) iOS doesn’t provide an API to do so, and 2) due to sandbox restrictions, an App can’t peak into other system activities. However, since this is a highly valuable information to infer the user’s interests, techniques exist to identify some of them. Here are some techniques:

  • listing the currently running processes using sysctl (We decrypted and opened the RATP binary in a hexeditor and searched for sysctl; See screenshot. It confirms the use of sysctl function in the RATP App).
  • detecting if a custom url can be handled or not (one can use canOpenURL function of UIApplication class. See more about URLSchemes.). If the url is handled, it confirm the presence of a particular App. You get the answer, but of course this technique requires you actively search for an App by yourself.

Now, the natural question arising in one’s mind would be: Why does the RATP App collect this info whereas they deny to do so in their In-App privacy policy? Well, to your surprise (or not to your surprise if you already aware of these Analytics and Advertising tracking companies), this data is sent to a server named sdk1.adgoji.com (IP Address:Port Number 175.135.20.107:47873) owned by Adgoji, a mobile audience targeting company. Does this company share this data back to RATP? We cannot say. In any case, it’s unclear how Adgoji treats the data and to whom the data is shared with. The questions remain… and only the parties involved can answer what terms and conditions they agreed upon.

Here is a screenshot where decrypted RATP app binary is opened in IDA Pro; you can see some methods inside AppDetectionController and AdGoJiModel class. The internals of the RATP App reveal that it uses the Adgoji library, which, in turn, does the job of collecting and sending the info to their server [Here are the name of header files generated by running class-dump-z on the decrypted binary revealing the classes from Adgoji company starting with prefix Adgoji].

To summarize, Adgoji tries to detect the Apps present on the phone to target the users based on their interests (e.g. if a user is a gamer or news reader or runner or blogger or radio listener etc.). Adgoji also collects the MAC Address, a permanent unique identifier attached to the device, to keep track of the device. They collect the device name as well, probably to infer the gender/country of the user.

What about Apple?

Well, Apple gives users a perception that they can control what private information is accessible to Apps in iOS 6. That’s true in case of Location, Contacts, Calendar, Reminders, Photos, and even your Twitter or Facebook account but Apps can still access other kinds of private data (for example, the MAC Address, Device Name, List of processes currently running etc.) without users’ knowledge. To avoid device tracking, Apple has deprecated the use of the permanent UDID and replaced it by a dedicated “AdvertisingID” that a user can reset at any time. This is certainly a good step to give control back to the user; by resetting this advertising identifier, trackers should not be able to link what you’ve done in the past with what you’ll be doing from that point onwards. But apparently, the reality is totally different: it only gives an illusion to the user that he is able to opt-out from device tracking because many tracking libraries are using other stable identifiers to do that:

  • Apps can access MAC address (again through sysctl function in libC dylib) to get a unique identifier permanently tied to a device which cannot be changed. Fortunately, the access to the MAC address seems to be banned from the new iOS7 version;
  • Apps can use UIPasteboard to share data (e.g. a unique identifier) between Apps on a particular device. For example, Flurry analytics library, also included in this App binary, is doing it! Flurry creates a new pasteboard item with name com.flurry.pasteboard of pasteboard type com.flurry.UID and stores a unique identifier whose hexadecimal representation looks like this 49443337 38383436 44452d32 3138302d 34414231 2d423536 432d3936 38363839 36443736 35333532 30443544 3338. A lot of other analytic companies are using the OpenUDID (which is again based on the use of UIPasteboard to share data between each other). Resetting the advertising ID will not impact this OpenUDID;
  • Apps can use the device name as an identifier, even if it’s far from being a unique identifier. Who cares to change it periodically? Even if it’s not unique, this is in practice a relatively stable identifier;
  • Or, simply, Apps can store the advertising identifier in some permanent place (e.g. persistent storage on the file system), and later, if this ID has been reset by the user, they can link it with the new advertising identifier. That’s so trivial to do…

We see there are several effective techniques to identify a terminal in the long term, and Apple cannot ignore this trend. Apple needs to take some rigorous steps in regulating these practices.

Also, we don’t understand why Apple is not giving control to the user to let him choose if an App can access the device name or not (we’ve seen that this is an information commonly collected). Earlier this year, we’ve developed an extension to the iOS6 privacy dashboard to demonstrate it’s feasibility and usefulness. Our extension to the privacy dashboard lets users choose if an App can access the device name (that often contains the real name of the iPhone owner) and if it can access the Internet (See our privacy extension package). It’s not sufficient, for sure, but it’s required.

You might also be interested in Paris Metro Tracks and Trackers: Why is RATP App leaking my private data? (Continued…)

Contact: Jagdish Achara, Vincent Roca, Claude Castelluccia

The PRIVATICS Inria team – July 2nd, 2013 – https://team.inria.fr/privatics/

———————————————————————————————-

The answer of RATP (added on July 5th, 2013):

RATP wishes to reply in light of the publication of our blog with the following items of additional information:

Data exchanges with the Adgoji server

–         SDK Sofialys (the adserving company for our online advertising sales service) sends information to the Adgoji server, the Fly Targeting system that provides contextual information about the public based on the applications installed on the terminal. Information recovered by SDK is processed for analysis, but does not make it possible under any circumstances to identify the data user.

–        No data collected by Adgoji concerning users of the RATP app have been used. The Fly Targeting module was under study in Sofialys, which mistakenly implemented it in its SDK in “production” phases. We are currently removing it from SDK.

Furthermore, we confirm that no personal data are used. In accordance with Apple directives, the UDID stopped being used last year. As for the IMEI: although the ID is already hashed, we are requesting a higher level of encryption for the next revision of SDK.

Jun 21

Comment protéger sa vie privée sur Internet

De récentes révélations ont mis en évidence des programmes de surveillance à grande échelle. Nous présentons ici un guide permettant aux utilisateurs soucieux de leur vie privée de se prémunir des menaces qui pèsent sur leurs informations personnelles. Ce guide se présente sous la forme d’une liste d’outils logiciels ou services qui permettent d’empêcher ou de limiter la collecte d’information personnelles lors de leurs activités dans le monde numérique.

Des outils et des solutions pour protéger notre vie privée

La liste suivante contient un ensemble d’outils qui permettent de protéger notre vie privée. Une partie de ces outils reposent sur l’utilisation d’outils cryptographique, qui permettent des communications sécurisées en assurant en particulier la confidentialité des messages échangées. D’autres outils bloquent la collecte de données personnelles ou reposent tout simplement sur des services qui ont fait le choix de ne pas collecter d’informations sur leurs utilisateurs.

Moteur de recherche

La plupart des moteurs de recherche collectent des informations sur leurs utilisateurs (mots clefs, adresse IP). Il existe des moteurs de recherche qui ne collectent pas ces informations :

Navigateur Web

Lorsque vous naviguez le web, les pages que vous affichez sont enregistrés par les sites que vous visitez, mais aussi par des entités tierces. Ces entités tierces tracent les utilisateurs afin de créer des profiles qui seront utilisés à des fin marketing. Ce traçage est rendu possible par des mouchards embarqués de manière invisible dans les pages Web. Il est possible de se prémunir contre ce profilage en utilisant des modules bloquant ces mouchards.

Il est possible de sécuriser l’utilisation du Web de manière à garantir la confidentialité de vos communications (pages affichées, mots de passe) mais aussi à s’assurer que le site que vous visitez est bien celui qu’il prétend être.  Si beaucoup de site Web supportent la sécurisation des connexions, essentielle pour votre sécurité et votre vie privée, un certain nombre d’acteurs ne l’activent pas par défaut. Pour activer cette sécurisation partout où elle est possible, vous pouvez utiliser la solution suivante :

Pour mesurer l’ampleur du traçage sur Internet, vous pouvez utiliser le module Collusion (pour Chrome ou Firefox) qui permet de visualiser en temps réel les entités qui tracent vos activités sur le Web. Si la nationalité des serveurs Web a une importance pour vous, il y a de module FlagFox qui affiche sous la forme d’un drapeau la localisation du site Web affiché.

E-mails

Que ce soit lorsqu’ils sont transmis sur Internet ou lorsqu’ils sont stockés dans nos boite mail, nos e-mails sont  directement lisibles par toute personne capable d’intercepter les communications ou d’accéder aux serveurs hébergeant notre boite au lettre électronique. Pourtant il existe un moyen simple de garantir la confidentialité de notre correspondance : la cryptographie. Voici un ensemble de logiciels permettant de protéger vos e-mails grâce à la cryptographie.

Téléphonie et SMS

Les communications téléphoniques comme les SMS peuvent  être interceptés et collectés. Il est possible de protéger la confidentialité de nos conversations téléphoniques et de nos messages en utilisant des applications mobiles utilisant des outils cryptographiques.

Pour les téléphones Android :

  • RedPhone  pour sécuriser les conversations téléphoniques sur Android
  • Gibberbot et TextSecure pour sécuriser les échanges de SMS et de MMS
  • Signal pour sécuriser conversations téléphoniques et SMS sur iOS

VoIP et messagerie instantanée

Que ce soit pour communiquer avec nos proches ou nos collègues, nous utilisons de plus en plus les systèmes de voix sur IP et de messagerie instantanée. A l’image de nos e-mails, ces communications peuvent également être interceptées. Il existe des alternatives aux traditionnels logiciels de messagerie instantanée qui peuvent garantir la confidentialité des messages échangés grâce aux outils cryptographiques qu’ils intègrent.

Cartes et géolocalisation

A l’image des moteurs de recherche et des pages Web, les services de cartographie en ligne collectent des informations sur leurs utilisateur. Ici encore, il existe des services alternatifs qui respectent la vie privée de leurs utilisateurs.

Anonymat sur Internet

Sur internet, les ordinateurs sont identifiés par un identifiant appelé adresse IP. Cette adresse est utilisée pour tracer les utilisateurs et peut éventuellement permettre de remonter à leur identité réel.  Elle est d’ailleurs enregistrée par la plupart des services auxquels nos accédons. Pour protéger notre vie privée, il peut ainsi être utile de cacher sa véritable adresse IP avec les outils suivants :

  • Tor le réseau d’anonymisation décentralisé
  • Tor Browser Bundle  pour une utilisation facile de Tor
  • Orbot pour utiliser Tor  sur son smartphone

Pour toute remarque suggestion d’outils, contactez mathieu.cunche@inria.fr.

L’équipe Privatics

Apr 23

PhD positions opening at INRIA-Privatics

We have three PhD positions available for highly motivated students interested in privacy. For more information, see the job section : jobs.

Apr 18

First results of the Mobilitics project

Last week, Inria and CNIL (french data protection agency) have published the first results of the Mobilitics project. This collaborative project between CNIL and Inria Privatics team aims to investigate privacy concerns for smartphone users. Those results shows that mobile application are accessing private information more than necessary.

Mar 12

Seminar on Software Define Radio, Security and Hacking

Seminar on Software Define Radio, security and hacking at CITI Lab (INSA-Lyon) – 13/03/2013, 14h – TD E. [link]

  • Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Cars (Aurélien Francillon – EURECOM)
  • On security aspects of ADS-B and other “flying” technology (Andrei Costin – EURECOM)

Feb 25

Privatics new website

Following the official creation of the Privatics team, here come a brand new website.
The website is powered by WordPress and uses the Inria’s custom Graphene template.

Jul 21

Your first news

Welcome to Teams Sites. This is your first news.