Title: A Framework for the Design of Secure and Efficient
Proofs of Retrievability
Abstract: Proofs of Retrievability (PoR) protocols ensure
that a client can fully retrieve a large outsourced file from
an untrusted server. Good PoRs should have low communication
complexity, small storage overhead and clear security guarantees.
The focus of this talk is to design good PoR schemes with simple
security proofs. To this end, we use the Constructive Cryptography
setting by Maurer. We propose a framework for the design of
secure and efficient PoR schemes based on Locally Correctable
Codes. We give a first instantiation of our framework using the
high rate lifted codes introduced by Guo et al. We assert the security
of our PoR by solving a finite geometry problem, giving an explicit
formula for the probability of an adversary to fool the client.
Using the local correctability properties of Tanner codes, we get
another instantiation of our framework and derive an analogous
formula for the success probability of the audit.
Slides:
