

Algebraic Cryptanalysis of the Rank Decoding and the MinRank problems

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MinRank

$$\text{Rank}(\sum_i x_i M_i) \leq r$$

Multivariate-based Cryptography

HFE, Rainbow, ...

Rank Decoding

$$\begin{pmatrix} \text{H} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \text{e} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \text{s} \end{pmatrix}$$

Rank-based Cryptography

ROLLO, RQC, Durandal, ...

Algebraic Cryptanalysis

- **Algebraic Attack:** one models a problem/cryptosystem with a **system of algebraic equations** and solves it.
- **Unique** solution.
- Solution: **private key** or the **plaintext**.
- Classic approaches:
 - multivariate resultant
 - regular chains
 - **Gröbner basis (GB) algorithms**
(F4 [Faugère, 1999], F5 [Faugère, 2002], XL [Courtois et al., 2000].)

- Number of equations \approx number of **distinct monomials** in the system.
- Solve the system directly by **linearization**,
- \implies huge **linear system**.
- Strassen (1969) or Wiedemann (1986) algorithms.

$$\begin{cases} f_1 = xz + yz + z \\ f_2 = yz + z + 1 \\ f_3 = xyz + xz + 1 \\ f_4 = xyz + z + 1 \end{cases}, \quad \in \mathbb{F}_2[x, y, z].$$

- $(x_0, y_0, z_0) \in (\mathbb{F}_2)^3$ s.t.

$$f_i(x_0, y_0, z_0) = 0, \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}.$$

- 20 distinct monomials of degree less than or equal to 3 in $\mathbb{F}_2[x, y, z]$.
- **5 monomials / 4 equations.**

$$(c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, \mathbf{1})^\top \in \text{Ker}_R(\mathcal{M}_{\leq 3}^{\text{ac}})$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} xyz & xz & yz & z & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \implies \begin{cases} xyz = 0 \\ xz = 1 \\ yz = 0 \\ z = 1 \end{cases} \implies \begin{cases} x = 1 \\ y = 0 \\ z = 1 \end{cases}$$

MinRank

Definition (MinRank Problem)

Input: K matrices $m \times n$ with coefficients in \mathbb{F}_q : M_1, M_2, \dots, M_K , and an integer $r \in \mathbb{N}$.

Output: elements $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_K \in \mathbb{F}_q$, such that $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_K) \neq (0, 0, \dots, 0)$ and


$$\text{Rank} \left(\sum_{i=1}^K x_i M_i \right) \leq r.$$


MinRank proven NP-complete in 1999 (Buss et al.).

Important fact in our modelings


 M of size $m \times n$ and rank r 

$SC = M$





$$SC = \sum_i^K x_i M_i$$



$$r + 1 \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\times \times \times \times \times \times \times \times} \\ \boxed{C} \end{array} \right. \implies \text{all maximal minors vanish!}$$

- First row: linear form in the x_i 's variables
- \implies equations of degree $r + 1$ (1,r)

Core idea

Each maximal minors ($r \times r$) of $C \implies$ a variable c_T

- **Bilinear system (1,1) in the variables x_i 's and c_T 's.**
- **SupportMinors** modeling.

$$E := \underbrace{m \binom{n}{r+1}}_{\text{equations}}$$

$$U := \underbrace{K \binom{n}{r}}_{\text{unknowns}}$$

Complexity of our algorithm against MinRank (heuristic):

When $E \geq U - 1$,

$$\mathcal{O}(E \times U^{\omega-1}).$$

If the condition $E \geq U - 1$ is not fulfilled:

- hybrid approaches
- new equations from multiplication by monomials in the x_i 's

$$x_{iCT} \quad (1,1)$$



$$\underbrace{x_i \dots x_j}_{\text{deg. } b-1} \quad x_{iCT} \quad (b,1)$$

Case $b = 2$

$$\underbrace{Km \binom{n}{r+1}}_{\text{equations}}$$

$$\underbrace{\overbrace{\binom{K+1}{2}}^{\text{deg. 2 mono. in the } x_i} \binom{n}{r}}_{\text{unknowns}}$$

Let J be a subset of $\{1, \dots, n\}$ of size $r + 2$, and $1 \leq i_1 < i_2 \leq m$,

$$\left| \begin{pmatrix} \frac{r_{i_1}}{r_{i_2}} \\ \frac{r_{i_2}}{r_{i_1}} \\ \mathbf{C} \end{pmatrix} \right|_J + \left| \begin{pmatrix} \frac{r_{i_2}}{r_{i_1}} \\ \frac{r_{i_1}}{r_{i_2}} \\ \mathbf{C} \end{pmatrix} \right|_J = 0$$

$$\sum \lambda_i x_i \underbrace{\left| \begin{pmatrix} \frac{r_{i_2}}{r_{i_1}} \\ \frac{r_{i_1}}{r_{i_2}} \\ \mathbf{C} \end{pmatrix} \right|_J}_{\substack{\text{an original equation ("}x_i c_T\text{"}) \\ \text{a new equation ("}x_i x_j c_T\text{"})}} + \sum \mu_i x_i \underbrace{\left| \begin{pmatrix} \frac{r_{i_1}}{r_{i_2}} \\ \frac{r_{i_2}}{r_{i_1}} \\ \mathbf{C} \end{pmatrix} \right|_J}_{\substack{\text{an original equation ("}x_i c_T\text{"}) \\ \text{a new equation ("}x_i x_j c_T\text{"})}} = 0$$

\implies Thus, we found **linear dependencies** between the new equations.

x_{iCT}

$(1,1)$

\Downarrow

\Downarrow

$\underbrace{x_i \dots x_j}_{\text{deg. } b-1} x_{iCT}$

$(b,1)$

Case $b = 2$

$$\underbrace{K^m \binom{n}{r+1} - \binom{n}{r+2} \binom{m+1}{2}}_{\text{equations}}$$

deg. 2 mono. in the x_i

$$\underbrace{\binom{K+1}{2} \binom{n}{r}}_{\text{unknowns}}$$

Rainbow parameters				Complexity		
				SM	Prev. MinRank	Best/Type
$(GF(q), v_1, o_1, o_2)$	n	K	r			
Ia($GF(16), 32, 32, 32$)	96	33	64	155	161	145/RBS
IIIc($GF(256), 68, 36, 36$)	140	37	104	208	585	215/DA
Vc($GF(256), 92, 48, 48$)	188	49	140	272	778	275/DA

[Beullens, Crypto 2022]

Breaking Rainbow Takes a Weekend on a Laptop

Ward Beullens 

IBM Research, Zurich, Switzerland
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Abstract. This work introduces new key recovery attacks against the Rainbow signature scheme, which is one of the three finalist signature schemes still in the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization project. The new attacks outperform previously known attacks for all the

- Matrix \mathbf{C} : row space basis
- $\forall \mathbf{A} \in \text{GL}_r(\mathbb{F}_q)$, \mathbf{AC} still works
- Variables $C_{i,j}$ in \mathbf{C} :
 - Degree r with minors
 - Too many solutions
- **Plücker coordinates**: projective + “1 v.s / 1 solution”

$$\begin{aligned} \rho: \{W \subset \mathbb{F}_q^n : \dim(W) = r\} &\longrightarrow \mathbb{P}^N(\mathbb{F}_q) \\ W &\longmapsto (|\mathbf{C}|_{*,T_i})_{i \in \{1..N+1\}}. \end{aligned}$$

where $N = \binom{n}{r} - 1$, and $T_i \subset \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$.

Rank Decoding

Given $H \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{(n-k) \times n}$ and $s \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{n-k}$.

\Rightarrow Find a **small rank weight** such that:

$$He^T = s^T$$

Rank metric on a toy example

Let $B = \{1, \alpha, \alpha^2, \alpha^3\}$ be a basis of \mathbb{F}_{2^4} seen as an \mathbb{F}_2 -vector space; $\alpha^4 = \alpha + 1$.

$$e := (\alpha^4 \quad 1 \quad \alpha^4 \quad 0 \quad \alpha) \in (\mathbb{F}_{2^4})^5$$

$$\text{Mat}(e) := \begin{matrix} 1 \\ \alpha \\ \alpha^2 \\ \alpha^3 \end{matrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \in (\mathbb{F}_2)^{4 \times 5}$$

$$\text{Rank}(e) := \text{Rank}(\text{Mat}(e)) = 2.$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& eH^\top = (0), \\
& \iff (1 \ \alpha \ \dots \ \alpha^{m-1}) \text{Mat}(e)H^\top = (0), \\
& \iff (1 \ \alpha \ \dots \ \alpha^{m-1}) SH^\top = (0), \\
& \iff \underbrace{((1 \ \alpha \ \dots \ \alpha^{m-1}) S)}_{e'} (CH^\top) = (0),
\end{aligned}$$

$$e' \neq 0 \in \text{Ker}(CH^\top) \implies \text{Rank}(CH^\top) < r.$$

Thus, all **maximal minors of CH^\top vanish.**

Proposition (Maximal Minors of CH^T)

The Maximal Minors of CH^T are polynomials over \mathbb{F}_{q^m} of the form

$$\sum_{T \subset \{1..n\}, \#T=r} (-1)^{f(T)} \det(H)_T \underbrace{\det(C)_T}_{:=c_T}$$

- \implies **linear system in the c_T 's.**
- This is the **MaxMinors** modeling.

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The Maximal Minors of CH^T are polynomials over \mathbb{F}_{q^m} of the form

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- \implies **linear system in the c_T 's.**
- This is the **MaxMinors** modeling.

Complexity of our algorithm against RD (conjecture):

When $m \binom{n-k-1}{r} \geq \binom{n}{r} - 1$,

$$\mathcal{O} \left(m \binom{n-k-1}{r} \binom{n}{r}^{\omega-1} \right).$$

$$\begin{cases} \binom{n}{r} - 1 & \text{variables } c_T\text{'s (in } \mathbb{F}_q), \\ m \binom{n-k-1}{r} & \text{equations over } \mathbb{F}_q. \end{cases}$$

Super-overdetermined case

One chooses **the biggest integer p** so that

$$\begin{aligned} m \binom{n-k-1-p}{r} &\geq \binom{n-p}{r} - 1 \\ \Rightarrow \mathcal{O} \left(m \binom{n-k-1-p}{r} \binom{n-p}{r}^{\omega-1} \right) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{cases} \binom{n}{r} - 1 & \text{variables } c_T\text{'s (in } \mathbb{F}_q), \\ m \binom{n-k-1}{r} & \text{equations over } \mathbb{F}_q. \end{cases}$$

Hybrid case

One chooses **the smallest integer a** so that

$$\begin{aligned} m \binom{n-k-1}{r} &\geq \binom{n-a}{r} - 1 \\ \implies \mathcal{O} \left(q^{ar} m \binom{n-k-1}{r} \binom{n-a}{r}^{\omega-1} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Cryptosystem	$RD(m, n, k, r)$	Sec.	Prev.	MaxMinors	(a, p)
Loidreau*	(128, 120, 80, 4)	256	98	65	(0, 3)
ROLLO-I	(79, 94, 47, 5)	128	117	71	(0, 9)
ROLLO-I	(89, 106, 53, 6)	192	144	87	(0, 0)
ROLLO-I	(113, 134, 67, 7)	256	197	158	(8, 0)
RQC-I	(97, 134, 67, 5)	128	123	77	(0, 18)
RQC-II	(107, 202, 101, 6)	192	156	101	(0, 10)
RQC-III	(137, 262, 131, 7)	256	214	144	(3, 0)

*[Loidreau, PQCrypto, 2017]



Bardet, Briaud, Bros, Gaborit, Neiger, Ruatta, and Tillich.
An Algebraic Attack on Rank Metric Code-Based Cryptosystems.
In *Eurocrypt*, 2020.



Bardet, Bros, Cabarcas, Gaborit, Perlner, Smith-Tone, Tillich, and Verbel.

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and MinRank problems.
In *Asiacrypt*, 2020.

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- Bardet, Briaud, Bros, Gaborit, Tillich.
*“Revisiting Algebraic Attacks on MinRank and on the Rank
Decoding Problem”*,
Preprint ArXiv, 2022.

Thank you for your attention!

