


NTRU **and** mod-uSVP₂


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- Reduction from mod-uSVP₂ to NTRU.
- Random self-reduction for mod-uSVP₂.

Definitions



A 2-dimensional lattice

Definition

For $\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ linearly independent, the lattice spanned by the basis $\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n$ is $\mathcal{L} = \sum_i \mathbb{Z} \cdot \mathbf{b}_i \subset \mathbb{R}^n$.

It is discrete and has a shortest non-zero vector.

Finding any short non-zero vector in \mathcal{L} given the $(\mathbf{b}_i)_i$ is hard in general.

We work with elements of $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1)$ for $n = 2^r$. ($R = \mathcal{O}_K$).

The size of an element $a \in R$ is $\|a\| = \left(\sum_i |a_i|^2\right)^{1/2}$.

The size of an element is the ℓ_2 -norm of its Minkowski embedding.

Definition ($NTRU_q$)

Let $f, g \in R$ with coefficients $\ll \sqrt{q}$ and f invertible mod q .

Given $h \in R$ such that $f \cdot h = g \pmod{q}$, find a small multiple of (f, g) .

Proposed first in [HPS96].

Used in NIST's post-quantum standardization process:

NTRU and **NTRUPrime**.

Advantages:

- Small keys.
- Fast encryption/decryption (much faster than RSA).
- Old.

[HPS96]: J. Hoffstein, J. Pipher, J. Silverman. ANTS 1998.

Module of rank 2

They are lattices where \mathbb{Z} becomes $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1)$.

Definition (Rank-2 module over R)

We take $\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2 \in R^2$. We define the module of basis $(\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2)$ to be

$$M = R \cdot \mathbf{b}_1 + R \cdot \mathbf{b}_2$$

Let \mathcal{O}_K for a number field K . Let $\mathfrak{b}_1, \mathfrak{b}_2$ ideals of \mathcal{O}_K and $\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2 \in R^2$. The module of pseudo-basis $(\mathfrak{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_1), (\mathfrak{b}_2, \mathbf{b}_2)$ is $M = \mathfrak{b}_1 \cdot \mathbf{b}_1 + \mathfrak{b}_2 \cdot \mathbf{b}_2$.

Difficulty

Here the security parameter is n , we work at fixed rank. Even finding short elements in Rank-1 modules is hard (Ideal-SVP).

The NTRU module

Given $h \in R$, the set of solutions for (f, g) is

$$M = \{(f_0, g_0)^T \in R^2, f_0 \cdot h = g_0 \bmod q\}$$

This is a **module** spanned by:


$$\mathbf{B} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ h & q \end{pmatrix} \quad \left(\mathcal{O}_K, \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ h \end{bmatrix} \right), \left(\mathcal{O}_K, \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ q \end{bmatrix} \right)$$

Solving NTRU is finding a short non-zero vector in M .


Big gap

$$\lambda_1 \leq \|(f, g)^T\| \ll \sqrt{q} \quad \text{versus} \quad \lambda_2 \geq \det(\mathbf{B})/\lambda_1 \gg \sqrt{q}.$$

Rank-2 Unique-SVP



Typical lattice



mod-uSVP₂ instance


mod-SVP₂

Given a basis \mathbf{B} of a module $M \subset R^2$, find a short non-zero vector in it.

γ -mod-uSVP₂: “generalized NTRU”

Given a basis \mathbf{B} of a module $M \subset R^2$ s.t. $\lambda_1(M) \leq \sqrt{\det(M)}/\gamma$, find a short non-zero vector in it.


For \mathbb{Z} -lattices



For R -modules

Worst-case

Average-case



[LS15]: A. Langlois, D. Stehlé. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 2015.

[AD17]: M. Albrecht, A. Deo. ASIACRYPT 2017.

[BDPW20]: K. Boer, L. Ducas, A. Pellet-Mary, B. Wesolowski. CRYPTO 2020.

[PS21]: A. Pellet-Mary, D. Stehlé. ASIACRYPT 2021.

$\text{mod-uSVP}_2 = \text{NTRU}$

Pre-HNF step

We will need that the first row spans the entire R , i.e., $\gcd(b_{11}, b_{12}) = 1$.

Basis	Short vector
$\begin{pmatrix} b_{11} & b_{12} \\ b_{21} & b_{22} \end{pmatrix}$	$\mathbf{s} = \begin{bmatrix} u \\ v \end{bmatrix}$
$(\mathbf{I} + \varepsilon) \times \downarrow$	$(\mathbf{I} + \varepsilon) \times \downarrow$
$\begin{pmatrix} b'_{11} & b'_{12} \\ b'_{21} & b'_{22} \end{pmatrix}$	$\mathbf{s}' = (\mathbf{I} + \varepsilon) \mathbf{s}$

We do that until $\gcd(b'_{11}, b'_{12}) = 1$. Until $\gcd(b_1 b'_{11}, b_2 b'_{12}) = \mathcal{O}_K$

It takes $O(\zeta_K(2))$ trials.

Hermite Normal Form

$$\begin{matrix} b_1 & b_2 \\ \left(\begin{array}{cc} b_{11} & b_{12} \\ b_{21} & b_{22} \end{array} \right) \end{matrix}$$

↓

$$\begin{matrix} b_1 & b_2 \\ \left(\begin{array}{cc} 1 & b_{12} \\ b'_{21} & b_{22} \end{array} \right) \end{matrix}$$

↓

$$\begin{matrix} \mathcal{O}_K & \mathcal{O}_K \\ \left(\begin{array}{cc} 1 & 0 \\ a & \mathbf{b} \end{array} \right) \end{matrix}$$

Using that $\gcd(b_{11}, b_{12}) = 1$.

Using that $\gcd(b_1 b'_{11}, b_2 b'_{12}) = \mathcal{O}_K$.

↓

Columns operations on the basis.

+ Principalisation by finding shorts vectors in b_i .

↓

Similar to the NTRU module $\begin{matrix} \mathcal{O}_K & \mathcal{O}_K \\ \left(\begin{array}{cc} 1 & 0 \\ a & \mathbf{q} \end{array} \right) \end{matrix}$

This changes neither the module nor the minimal vector. (Yes it does).

Difference with NTRU: $q \in \mathbb{Z}$ versus $b \in R$.

From the HNF to NTRU


We multiply the bottom row by q/b and round.
If $q \approx b$, this does not change the geometry (much).

Basis	Short vector
$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ a & b \end{pmatrix}$	$\mathbf{s} = \begin{bmatrix} u \\ v \end{bmatrix}$
↓	↓
$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ \lfloor a \cdot q/b \rfloor & q \end{pmatrix}$	$\mathbf{s}' = \begin{bmatrix} u \\ v \cdot q/b - u \cdot \{a \cdot q/b\} \end{bmatrix}$

We can use an NTRU solver to solve a mod-uSVP_2 instance!

Random Self-reducibility of mod-uSVP₂

Anatomy of a mod-uSVP₂ instance: QR factorization



Any (free) mod-uSVP₂ instance has a basis

$$\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{Q} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} r_{11} & r_{12} \\ 0 & r_{22} \end{pmatrix}$$


with $r_{11} \ll r_{22}$, $r_{12} \in \left(-\frac{r_{11}}{2}, \frac{r_{11}}{2}\right)$ and \mathbf{Q} orthogonal.

Goal for the randomization:

- Randomize \mathbf{Q} .
- Randomize r_{11} and r_{22} .
- Randomize r_{12} .

Difficulty: we don't have access to the good basis.

Anatomy of a mod-uSVP₂ instance (true version)



Any mod-uSVP₂ instance of norm 1 and gap γ has a basis

$$\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{Q} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \mathfrak{b}_1/\gamma & \mathfrak{b}_2 \cdot \gamma \\ 1 & r_{12} \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

with


- $\mathfrak{b}_1, \mathfrak{b}_2$ (replete) ideals of norm 1.
- $r_{12} \in K \otimes \mathbb{R}$ defined modulo the ideal $\mathfrak{b}_1 \mathfrak{b}_2 \cdot \gamma^{-2}$.
- \mathbf{Q} orthogonal.

Randomization of r_{11} and r_{22}

We multiply by a scalar: this changes r_{11} and r_{22} but r_{11}/r_{22} is fixed.

We multiply by a random ideal: this changes b_1 and b_2 but b_1/b_2 is fixed.

Solution: sparsification by a prime p (a prime ideal \mathfrak{p}).



Sparsification by (p, \mathbf{b}^\vee)

For p prime and $\mathbf{b}^\vee \in M^\vee$, $M_p = \{\mathbf{m} \in M, \langle \mathbf{m}, \mathbf{b}^\vee \rangle = 0 \pmod p\}$.

This multiplies the non-zero shortest vector by p with high probability:
this multiplies r_{11} by p and leaves r_{22} unchanged.

Interlude: how to sample random ideals?

Let K be a number field of degree d . We denote $K_{\mathbb{R}} = K \otimes \mathbb{R}$.

Theorem ([BDPW20, Theorem 3.3])

If \mathfrak{p} is uniform in the set of prime ideals of norm less than $d^O(d)$, $x \leftarrow \mathcal{N}_H(0, d^{-3/2})$ and $r \in K_{\mathbb{R}}$ uniform such that $|r_i| = 1$ for all i , then

$$r \cdot \exp(x) \cdot \mathfrak{p} / \mathcal{N}^{\frac{1}{d}}(\mathfrak{p}) \simeq \mathcal{U}(\text{ideals of norm 1})$$


We consider the set of replete ideals of norm 1, i.e. the set of ideals times an element of $K_{\mathbb{R}}$.

H is the space of element of trace 0.

Take away: multiplying by a uniform prime (times a small element) is the same as multiplying by a uniform ideal, up to scaling.

[BDPW20]: K. de Boer, L. Ducas, A. Pellet--Mary, B. Wesolowski. CRYPTO 2020.

Randomization of r_{12}



Idea: blur the space by a gaussian \mathbf{D} .

$$\mathbf{D} \cdot \mathbf{Q} \sim \mathbf{D} = \mathbf{Q}' \cdot \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ 0 & c \end{pmatrix}.$$

Then

$$M' = \mathbf{D} \cdot M \sim \mathbf{Q}' \cdot \begin{pmatrix} r'_{11} & r'_{12} \\ 0 & r'_{22} \end{pmatrix}$$

where

$$r'_{12} = (b + ar_{12}) \bmod r'_{11} \\ \approx \text{Unif}(R \bmod r'_{11}).$$

The “good basis” is randomized, but not the “bad” one.


Basis	Short vector
$\begin{pmatrix} \tilde{b}_{11} & \tilde{b}_{12} \\ \tilde{b}_{21} & \tilde{b}_{22} \end{pmatrix} \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^{2 \times 2}$	$\tilde{\mathbf{s}} = \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{u} \\ \tilde{v} \end{bmatrix}$
$(M^V)^2 \ni (\lambda \mathbf{I} + \varepsilon) \times \downarrow$	$(\lambda \mathbf{I} + \varepsilon) \times \downarrow$
$\begin{pmatrix} b_{11} & b_{12} \\ b_{21} & b_{22} \end{pmatrix} \in R^{2 \times 2}$	$\mathbf{s} = (\lambda \mathbf{I} + \varepsilon) \tilde{\mathbf{s}} \in R^2$

Then take HNF.

What did I hide?

- We work over number fields all along.
- Modules are not necessarily free (everything in grey).
- We use a mod-SVP_1 -solver to take care of non-free modules.
- The HNF can take a $O(\zeta_K(2))$ running time due to the Pre-HNF step.
- Polynomial losses in approximation factors.
- The distribution analysis uses Rényi divergence and statistical distance.

Contributions




[This Talk]

Open problems

- We need a mod-SVP_1 solver to sample from our average-case distribution, can we get rid of it?
- Can we sample a NTRU instance with a trapdoor from our distribution, without a mod-SVP_1 solver?
- Composability of our reduction with the NTRU search-to-decision reduction from [PS21].
- For which K is $\zeta_K(2)$ polynomial?

Any question?



Newton's fractal of the NTRUPrime polynomial for $p = 7$.